



# On the European experience in critical infrastructure

DCAF  
a centre for security,  
development and  
the rule of law




# This presentation is about:

- Facts
- Observations
- Conclusions

... to read, understand and use the international experience

# How we did get here?



# European CI

- Increasingly global
- Highly concentrated
- Complex – the weakest component determines the overall level of security of the system/state
- Unbounded or at least trans-border
- Networked through ICT
- Private (>85%) and public, internationally owned,
- More quickly developing than security standards
- Depends on political and business decision-makers
- **Vulnerability - an expanding phenomena**

# EU paradigm: "Secure Societies" in Horizon 2020:

## Specific mission areas

- Fighting crime and terrorism
- Strengthening security through border management
- Providing cyber security
- Increasing Europe's resilience to disasters  
**(including critical infrastructure protection)**
- Ensuring privacy in the Internet and enhancing the societal dimension
- CFSP related issues ('dual-use' – Civil focus)

**Key  
European  
CIP  
Principles**

**Sector-  
by-  
sector**  
approach

**Proportionality**

risk assessment-  
proportional measures

**Subsidiarity**

countries first, EU support

**Complementarity**

build on existing measures

**Stakeholder Cooperation**

**Confidentiality**

# Threat perception on CIP

Who is threatening +  
What is threatened =  
*Protection*

**State actors**

**Natural & man-made hazards**

**War**


**Economy & public wealth**

**National security**

**Crime, espionage**

**Terror**

**Non-state actors**



# Definition

European Commission	“An <b>asset, system or part thereof</b> located in member states that is essential for the maintenance of <b>vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people</b> , and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact on a member state as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.”
NATO	“Critical Infrastructure is those <b>facilities, services and information systems</b> which are so vital to nations that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on <b>national security, national economy, public health and safety and the effective functioning of the government.</b> ”
Germany	“Critical infrastructures are <b>organisations and physical structures and facilities</b> of such vital importance to a nation’s society and economy the community that their failure or degradation would result in sustained <b>supply shortage, significant disruptions to public safety and security, or other dramatic consequences.</b> ”
The Netherlands	“Critical infrastructure refers <b>to products, services and the accompanying processes</b> that, in the event of disruption or failure, could cause major social disturbance. This could be in the form of <b>tremendous casualties and severe economic damage... ”</b>
The United Kingdom	The Critical National Infrastructure comprises of <b>those assets, services and system that support the economic, political and social life</b> of the UK whose importance is such that loss could: <b>1) cause large-scale loss of life; 2) have a serious impact on national economy; 3) have other grave social consequences for the community; or 4) be of immediate concern to the national government’</b>



# EU goes to Horizon 2020

- The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action (2010)
- Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance,(2010)
- The EU Action Plan on combating terrorism
- The Security Industry Policy Action Plan (2012)
- Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace COM (2013)
- The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012–2016
- European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (2006)
- Civilian Headline Goal (2008)

# Sectorial coverage of CIP

Sector	Netherlands	UK	Germany	EU
Energy	x	x	x	x
ICT	x	x	x	x
Finance	x	x	x	x
Health care	x	x	x	x
Food	x	x	x	x
Water	x	x	x	x
Transport	x	x	x	x
Safety	x	Emergency med.		x
Government&PA	x	x	x	x
Chemicals	x			x
Defence industry	x			
Others	Judicial		Media & culture	Space and research facilities

# Largest number of CI sectors: USA

1. Agriculture and food
2. Energy
3. Public Health
4. Emergency Services
5. Government
6. Defense Industrial Base
7. Information & Telecommunications (Cyber)
8. Water Supply Systems
9. Transportation
10. Banking and Finance
11. Chemicals and Hazardous Materials
12. Postal
13. Ports and Shipping

# Information sharing

Credible threats  
Warnings

Send and receive –  
real time  
collaboration

CI status  
CI environment  
Programmes  
Activities

Private sector


Central CIP agency  
- Fused info  
- Situational awareness  
- Co-ordination

State CI agencies


Regional and  
local  
authorities

Suspicious activities  
Incidents info  
Subject matter expertise

Suspicious activities  
Incidents info  
Response info



# CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION FRAMEWORK



# CIP planning

(different approach – different results)

- Scenarios
  - Context (“Alternative futures”)
  - Situational
- Modeling and simulations
  - Data fusion: People and their institutions, Nations and international relations, Earth and its resources, Technologies and their exploration
- Capabilities based planning
  - Sectorial, but
  - Integrated

# Organisational models

- **USA** – Department of Homeland Security
- **Canada** - (“Total defence”) Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness
- **UK** – state: National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre; pub./pra.: Information Assurance Advisory Council
- **Netherlands** – state: strategy, laws, innovations; private: “Electronic, Commerce, Platform Netherlands”
- **Switzerland** – state: political-military function (FDD,CP&S), no central body, no integration of private sector
- **Sweden** – (“Total defence”) state: Swedish Emergency Management Agency + Technical competence Centre + CovCERT; private: fully integrated into SEMA
- **Finland** – (“Total defence”) National Emergency Supply Agency
- **Germany** – Mol leads through Office of Civil Protection and Disaster assistance, Federal Office for Information Security, Police, FI Technical Support Service


# Observations on European CIP policy

## Complicating environment, difficult solutions

- Government (economy first), business (national and foreign) and society (liberal) are increasingly dependent on infrastructure
- Critical infrastructures are increasingly dependent on each other; urbanisation and re-industry will further complicate
- Our knowledge of the causes of failure or attack to infrastructure is still limited
- Complicated security context Disaster management, Terrorism, Climate change, National, Homeland, Societal, ... security, Peace, Crisis, War, International
- EU member states still have fragmented CIP policies   
(highest interest in USA, Switzerland, Netherlands & Sweden; growing in Germany, France,)



# The way ahead: protection through resilience



# Conclusions on CIP policy

- The need to protect critical infrastructure is real, and potentially determines a trade-off between (short-term) efficiency and (long-term) resilience and sustainability.
- The key foundations of a CIP policy are a widely communicated **vision** and a forward-looking **strategy**, coupled with strong **political commitment**.

# CIP policy recommendations

- **CIP policy should be:**

1. An application of a more holistic all-hazards approach and focused on long-term resilience;
2. Based on unified taxonomy, metrics and risk management;
3. Centralised in a limited number of bodies;
4. Inclusive of the cyber-dimension;
5. Sector specific;
6. Build sector-by-sector
7. Internationally bounded.