What is the general mood in the Ukrainian army and what are the guiding principles for officers in the Armed Forces? To answer those questions, we will use the results of surveys, conducted by the author in the summer and autumn of 1998. The survey consists of 1860 respondents who represent all the branches and divisions of the military.

    The army is the most stable and politically inert institution of the state. Other state institutions and structures are often being liquidated or reorganized, and lots of prominent statesmen leave the political scene. But the army, having experienced some minor reform, will always support the political leadership. Under the conditions of a social developmental crisis, the stability of the army is one of the most decisive factors that provide for stability in society and country. In addition, military self-appraisal and political orientation plays a most significant role. This was noted long ago by the former commander of the Kyiv military district, General M. Dragomyrov, who once wrote - “as are the officers, so is the army.”

    Over the past 8 years of continuing economic crisis in Ukraine, there has been a decline in understanding by the ruling elite of the internal dynamics of the Armed Forces. Moreover, the army has been the most potent political force of the state since the times of Peter I until the end of the 1980s. This same army was once the object of pride and love of the Soviet people. Today, it sits on the political sidelines of Ukrainian society. It is notable that during the last parliamentary elections in Ukraine, not a single individual from the military was elected, despite consistently high ratings of confidence in sociological surveys.

    The removal of the military from its pedestal is due to a wide array of reasons, ranging from the country’s social crisis to the peculiarities of Ukrainian mentality. Another reason has been the tendency to simply discuss problems in the military instead of solving them. These aspects have left a negative impression upon military officers.

AND ECONOMIC REALITIES

    The state of the army generally reflects the situation in the country. The military, as a particular social institution, is dependent on other state institutions. It is also constantly influenced by complex web of social and political processes.

    The material, technical and financial support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine changed for the worse. The factors behind this are the economic crisis, the sharp decline of industrial and agricultural production, the curtailing of the military-industrial complex, the disconnect of economic ties within the arms industry, and the irrational reduction in defense funding, that last barely constituted 1.3 % of GNP. Military equipment and weapons systems have quickly dilapidated. In the near future, this will affect up to 70% of armored and artillery machinery in the ground forces alone. The service and repair of military equipment and weapons is becoming more and more complicated, which in turn has lead to the discrepancy between technical needs for combat efficiency and the actual state of affairs.

    This result is a drop in the popularity of military service, as evidenced that only one third of the officer corps and less than half of enlisted     personnel say that their interest in modern military machinery is their main motives in entering military service. In addition, the aging of equipment reduces its combat efficiency and results in an increased malfunction, accidents, and injuries. This destroys the faith of military personnel in the power and reliability of their weapons. Eventually, the low technical readiness of armaments and the deficit in fuel and lubricating materials will force military leaders to curtail training in field, air, and naval operations, which according to some estimates made up only 5-10% of recommended need in the first half of this year. All this affects the professionalism of the military.

    This sad state of affairs is reflected both in the moral condition of military personnel and the country’s security in general.

    But the state risks to lose not only its military arsenal, but also its cadre of trained officers. The lack of popularity for the military profession and the decline in its living standards and other social problems all lead to a negative attitude of officers with regards to their social status (diagrama1). In no other profession than the military does one feel so strongly the direct consequences of political decisions.

    Thus, military personnel feel an additional burden caused by social problems. For example, roughly 25% of officers in the Armed Forces have their own accommodations, but among those who serve outside the cities, this figure is only about 16%. Because of this, nearly 45% of officers have either to live in either dormitories without any luxuries, or to rent additional accommodations at their own expense. At certain military installations, only 7% of servicemen have their own apartment, although this figure is compensated somewhat by the fact that nearly 39% of officers have regular accommodations. But at some military installations, 14% of officers have to rent their own residence. Nearly 7% of officers have to live away from their families because of lack of accommodations after transfer to a new installation.

    Another problem is the lack of work for family members. At some military installations, nearly 52% of officers’ wives are unemployed (along with non-officers’ spouses the figure is 35%). The decrease in popularity of military service (only 20% of military officers are satisfied in their work today) leads to a lack in young officers in the military. The percentage of new military officer positions has fallen from 90% to 60% since 1992.

    New recruits, frightened about rumors of hazing in boot camp, literally flee from the army. According to the Ministry of Defense, out of 100 draftees, only 11-15 actually carry out their service.

THE MILITARY ON THE “DEFENSE”

    Certain political forces contribute to the military’s fall in morale by instituting discreditation campaigns against it. First, the Armed Forces and the defense industry are groundlessly accused of devastating the national economy. The reduction and reorganization of the army is being conducted today under these slogans. And all this is based not on scientific grounds but on the desire to please certain political interests conflict with needs of the country and the military. Here is some data from the budget of Ukraine in the past few years – in percentage to GNP meant for defense comparing with percentage for managing and law enforcement activity based on the data of Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 1995 – 1.66% vs. 2.80; 1996 – 1.5% vs. 2.05%; 1997 – 1.88% vs. 2.68%.

    Second, the myth about the degradation, in the army, about sadism and violence that is allegedly characteristic of the army, is being constantly driven into the people’s minds. This contributes to generating a general fear of the military. 95 % of students expressed suspicion, indifference, animosity, or hatred towards army in our poll.

On this basis, and because of the absence of concrete actions directed against these negative thoughts, it is not surprising that more than 70% of officers feel that the country’s leadership is indifferent to the Armed Forces and its needs. More than 10% think that this attitude is rather hostile or scornful. Thus, the pessimistic attitude for positive change (Diagram 2), and the cynical attitude of military personnel towards the country’s power structures, their ability lift Ukraine out of economic stagnation, and solve social problems, is quite understandable.

Diagram 2. Attitudes of officers regarding positive change in Ukraine in the next 2 to 3 years

    Commissioned officers primarily associate positive change in society with the establishment of a “firm leadership” and a “strong hand” of a widely recognized national leader. A second notion is associated with the creation of “tight union of Slavic states,” ( table 1). These notions are to a great extent characteristic of elder officers over 46 years old. Young people usually do not favor the idea of such a union”.

Table 1.

    It is necessary to mention those efforts that military personnel recognize as useless. First, and foremost, those efforts are: “Further development of democratic processes in the country (what democratic processes could be under regime of “strong hand?”), second, “the development of market principles in the economy”, and third, “rapprochement of Ukraine with European countries.”

    It is interesting to note that those who believe in a “strong hand,” and the formation of a union of Slavic states to a greater extent do not believe in the possibility of positive change! Ukrainian officers associate real change with more effective governmental administration and new leadership. This category of optimists sooner believes in the further development of a market economy and democratic development.

THE ARMY AND POWER

    Military opinion on social institutions (not personalities) the activity of which they connect with future positive change in Ukraine, is rather interesting. The main hope for positive change is based first on the Executive Branch, followed by Parliament and the Armed Forces. Then comes the Cabinet of Ministers and law-enforcement agencies (diagram 3). Those who really believe in possibility of positive changes connect them with the President (43.4%), the Supreme Rada (26.2%) followed by the Cabinet of Ministers - (23%).

    Thus we may draw a conclusion – on the whole, there is a positive attitude towards a strong executive branch. At the same time, the amount of its supporters is not essentially larger than the amount of those who support a cooperation of both those who are in power and new people, mainly in the Parliament.

    The army is always in the center of political processes due to the fact that it is the most mobile, organized, disciplined and, first and foremost,  the armed institution of the state. On this basis, it is interesting to examine military opinion on the political nature and orientation of other state institutions.

    On the other hand, “leftism” has a situational character and to some extent is connected with moral and psychological state. Thus among those respondents who feel “apathy and depression” 25.9% support the Communist Party. Of those who feel “encouraged and enthusiastic,” only 17.2% voted for the CPU. Political orientation is a associated with age, however. Thus the 20.6% of military personnel support the CPU under 35 years of age, and more than 27% from 36 to 45.

    Such a situation is first of all a holdover from the past, when communist ideologists were part and parcel of up-bringing in the Soviet army and this holdover reflects these statistics. Moreover because of the continuing changes in factional alignments, a lot of officers have become politically apathetic. 26.5% of formerly politically active members in Soviet society in our survey responded that no political party or block could solve all the problems in Ukraine, and 22.3% were unsure of the answer. There is only a small detail – according to the opinion poll, the centrist party “Reforms and Order” enjoys great popularity among military personnel. It is possible that the word “order” in itself corresponds to the internal aspiration of military men for order and pragmatic social and political guiding lines.

THE EYES OF ARMY

    Polled believe that Ukraine’s existence hinders on the state of the economy. At the same time, more than a third of officers think that political and misinformation problems are the greatest foreign threat to Ukraine’s security.  

 Diagram 4. Evaluation the threat to the national security of Ukraine on the part of other countries

    According to diagram 5 we can make a conclusion that unfortunately in general the military bears a naive provincialism and lack of understanding in evaluating world social and political processes. Otherwise, it just hard to imagine how it is possible to combine a negative attitude towards the democratic development and a free-market economy, while associating the Communist Party and ideology with active Co-operation with European Community.

    The opinions about this block of problems differs greatly. Active cooperation with the European Community is supported by 35-37% of military personnel between the ages of 26 and 45, 18.4% of those under 25, while 7.7 % of those between 46 and 50. At the same time 38.5% those eldest polled support closer ties with the CIS. Those who support strengthening integration with Slavic countries are mainly 36 - 45 years old (table 3).

Table 3.

    The opinions about this block of problems differs greatly. Active cooperation with the European Community is supported by 35-37% of military personnel between the ages of 26 and 45, 18.4% of those under 25, while 7.7 % of those between 46 and 50. At the same time 38.5% those eldest polled support closer ties with the CIS. Those who support strengthening integration with Slavic countries are mainly 36 - 45 years old (table 3).

    It is rather interesting to follow the dynamic of changes in the attitude of officers and ensigns towards the problem compared to 1997. The data shows a general decrease in hope for internal problem solving by foreign cooperation, apart from certain increase of nostalgic feelings for USSR.

INSTEAD OF AN EPILOGUE

    The army is defender of the national interests. It has to be the institution which is least affected by the economic crises and political disagreements. This is going to be extremely important for ensuring social stability under conditions of aggravation of conflicts between various political forces. The declarations by the leadership about the Armed Forces in their devotion to the Constitution of Ukraine, laws, and to the military oath; sticking to the principle “the military is above politics”; the path to non-interference in the “settlement of accounts” stymie inflamed and impatient politics and “street rebels,” and bring consolation to the people. Volgin, a famous academic of military and political problems in Russia at the turn of the century, was category against military interference in politics. He underlined: “The army can be compared to ballast that lies at the bottom of the ship. No matter what happens on the ship, no matter how severe the storm is, as long as the ballast is in place, there is always hope for salvation. But the real misfortunes are going to happen when the ballast fastening breaks down and the ballast will start swinging, leading to a shipwreck.”

    The country’s leadership must pay sufficient attention to satisfy the needs of the army and to avoid actions that could create a “divergence of views. This situation has led to many a fallen state.