The primary foundation for this architecture is the system of international agreements in the restriction and reduction of conventional and strategic armaments, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the means of delivery for weapons of mass destruction, the prevention of development, production, accumulation and use of chemical and biological weapons, and international agreements with measures to strengthen stability and security.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE

    Currently, Vienna is host to the exceedingly important talks on the adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and modernization of the Viennese document in light of the new military-political reality.

    The primary idea of the CFE, signed in 1990, was to decrease the dangerous concentration of armaments which existed on that time on the division line between the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NАТО.

    Developed under conditions of intense confrontation between the two blocs, the treaty provided for the reduction of a significant quantity of conventional armaments, and increased the exchange of information and verifications. Regular information exchange and continuous reciprocal inspections established an atmosphere of confidence and transparency between the states-parties, which significantly impacted stability on the European continent.

    However, over the last several years, the situation in Europe has experienced fundamental changes that necessitate adapting the Treaty. The primary area of change concerns the elimination of the bloc-to-bloc structure in the original CFE. In order to avoid the establishment of a new line in Europe, the bloc-to-bloc structure and regional quotas would be replaced with the establishment of individual arms quotas for the states-parties of the CFE.

    The Viennese document from the 1994 talks (VD –94) with measures to strengthen security and stability was accepted at the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) meeting in Budapest, November 1994. It became a continuation and development of the preliminary documents — VD-90 and VD-92. The Treaty’s participants are the 53 OSCE countries, and covers the territory in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, as well as Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. VD-94 is politically binding document that provides for the implementation of a wide range of measures aimed at increasing transparency between the states-parties on the structure and the number of armed forces, new types of armaments, implementation control over military activities etc.

    In the course of the December 1998 Oslo meeting, the OSCE foreign ministers made the decision to complete negotiation on the CFE adaptation and improvement of the VD-94 during the Istanbul OSCE summit, scheduled for November 1999. Successful accomplishment of these two negotiation processes into concrete terms would be a significant step towards improving the system of arms control and providing for its viability in the future. Ukraine is an active participant in the talks and devotes considerable efforts to ensure that these documents become a reliable basis of control over conventional armed forces in the future.

LIGHT ARMAMENTS AND WEAPONS

    It should be noted that reductions in the main categories of CFE conventional arms and control over them couldn’t entirely meet the aim of avoiding contemporary risks. As experience of the past several years demonstrates, the main danger in global stability is not full-scale war involving the participation of the rich countries, but rather local armed conflicts involving heavy use of light armaments and weapons. In light of such developments, control over the distribution of light armaments and weapons becomes extremely topical.

    At the 4 November 1998 OSCE Forum on security cooperation, the Dutch delegation proposed to the OSCE states-parties to commence preparations on a Convention concerning the prevention of and struggle against illegal trafficking in light arms and weapons, ammunition and other similar means. The first discussion of this initiative bore record to the fact that the majority of states-parties of the OSCE, including Ukraine, give this question a significant amount of attention and consider it as an important component in the arms control system, especially in countries and regions plagued by conflicts.

OPEN SKIES

    Another important factor in ensuring global stability is the Open Skies Treaty (OS). Signed in Helsinki on March 24, 1992, the OS became one of the first international agreements that Ukraine signed as a sovereign country. The Treaty establishes a so-called regime of “open skies” which grants states-parties the opportunity to perform observation flights over the entire territory of its signatory nations The goal of such flights is to assist in the security and confidence building in the arms control and verification process, achieve greater transparency in military activities, and expand OSCE peacekeeping related to the prevention and resolution of crisis situations. The area that falls under the OS treaty covers North America, almost all of Europe, and the Asian section of Russia to the Pacific Ocean.

    For the realization of Treaty provisions, Ukraine uses an array of political and technical measures. An important proof of this came when Ukraine conducted a joint Ukrainian-Canadian training exercise flight over the territories of Canada and Ukraine. It is currently preparing for its Ukrainian-British training flight. Such steps clearly attest to Ukraine’s dedication to the objectives of the OS Treaty. This provides assurance to the other participants that Ukraine will do everything possible to ensure that the Open Skies Treaty will be quickly ratified and receive its proper place in the international arms control regime.

    However, despite the important role that the treaty has earned in the international security structure, it has yet to be ratified by the Verhovna Rada having become an internal “engagement” policy battle.

NEIGHBORLY SECURITY

    Evidence of Ukraine’s aspirations to develop a new security system is its active work in the negotiation of agreements concerning additional measures to stabilization relations and security with neighboring countries.

    The first is the Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the government of the Hungarian Republic, signed on October, 27 1998 in Budapest by the defense minister of both countries, on measures to stabilize security and to develop bilateral military relations. Ukraine conducts active talks on these issues with Romania. Similar proposals were made by our country to Belarus, the Russian Federation, Moldova, Poland, and Slovakia. With the exception of Russia, all of the listed countries expressed a positive attitude to the idea. The Russian Federation has yet to respond to the proposal sent on January 1998.

    Our country’s efforts conducted in this area attest to Ukraine’s dedication to commitments of the Viennese document and decisions from the Lisbon OSCE summit, which are intended to develop states-parties’ legal and political obligations directed on the avoidance destabilizing arms build-up. Agreements on additional measures to stabilize security relations between adjacent countries are an important component.

    Ukraine’s contribution in the development of regional security and cooperation lies in its initiative to begin preliminary negotiations on measures to stabilize security for Black Sea military forces; all six Black Sea countries are involved (Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine). Military-Naval activity has yet to be penetrated by stability and security measures on account of the specific character of naval forces. Therefore, OSCE states-parties are interested in progress with the negotiations; it is possible that experience gained by the Black Sea countries could be applied in the future to deepen transeuropean military relations.

    All Black Sea countries asserted that future measures will be aimed at ensuring stability and security in the Black Sea, without imposing restriction on the freedoms for third countries to engage in navigation and naval activity.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    One of the most exceedingly “sensitive” aspects of international security, which will dominate the XXI century, is the problem of nuclear arms reduction. Our country bears the terrible consequences of the Chernobyl disaster and fully understands the threat of catastrophe that nuclear weapons carry. Ukraine significantly contributed to the stabilization of peace on planet, voluntarily having forgone the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. We believe in the accuracy of such a course and appeal to other countries to follow suit and do everything possible to ensure that the next millennium will be once and for all free of nuclear arms.

    This is why the developments in South Asia are quite comprehensible to our country. Ukraine fully understands the potential threat of setting a precedent for the acquirement of nuclear status even by one additional country and subsequently defends its position regarding the necessity of maintaining all political pressures for the prevention of nuclear proliferation in the world.

    Particular attention is given on account of the aggravated situation in Kashmir, where there is the potential threat of a local armed conflict developing onto a nuclear one, with global consequences. Concern is also called up on account of the statement of India’s Security Council describing the country’s nuclear doctrine, which was subsequently forwarded for confirmation by the newly elected government.

    Ukraine made a special appeal to India and Pakistan to develop a political dialog with a view to settling the situation in the region, quickly acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and ceasing militarization of its nuclear and missile programs. The actions of these countries can have ruinous consequences for the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime. Ukraine also called on them to take commitments to ensure effective control of the export of materials, equipment, and technologies that can be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction. Our country was among the initiators of the consideration of this question at a UN Security Council session, subsequently backed by resolution No. 1172.

    Ukraine’s active position in nonproliferation received the acknowledgment of the global community. As a result, the head of our foreign policy office was invited to a meeting with the G-8 foreign ministers (London, 12.05.98), China, Argentina, South Africa and Brazil, where the South Asian situation was examined and sanctions were applied to India and Pakistan.

    The “stagnancy” in Russian-American progress in nuclear disarmament is important since it is one of the factors that potentially threatens the successful development of a world security structure. It is believed that until progress will be achieved in the relations between the two countries in possession of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, very little improvement will be made in the reduction of nuclear weapons.

    We are convinced of the necessity to constantly improve the nuclear nonproliferation regime, whose strength was tested after India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests. It is necessary to adhere to existing, to conclude new multilateral agreements, and also to make concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament by the nuclear states. Essential progress in the realization of this aim lies in the further implementation of several international Treaties, taking the nuclear “five” commitments concerning the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons into concrete terms.

AND TOXIC WEAPONS

    No less important are the questions remaining over the prohibition of chemical weapons. In Paris January 13, 1993, the Convention on the ban on the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons was opened up for signing. In November of last year, it came into effect for Ukraine. Hereby, our country made one more concrete contribution towards the development of an all-encompassing global security system.

    Another important factor in preserving world stability is the complete adherence to the Convention on the ban of development, manufacture, and stockpiling of biological and toxic weapons (BWC).

    The BWC came into force on March 26, 1975 after ratification by 22 countries. By August 18, 1999, the Convention was already signed by over 150 countries, 141 of which had been ratified. Ukraine became a party to the agreement as a Soviet Republic when it signed the BWC as co-author on April 10, 1972, and ratified it on February 21, 1975.

    The primary drawback of the Convention is the absence of a responsible regime to verify implementation of its provisions. This, in turn, contributes to the continuation of biological and toxic weapons development by several countries.

    Ukraine considers the absence of a verification regime for the BWC a serious barrier towards its implementation and entirely backs the EU’s request to quicken work on a Protocol, which would specify effective control over the implementation of Convention provisions. In this manner, our country is conducting active work and contributing to an array of initiatives which will strengthen the BWC.

    With the goal to improvement and subsequent development of a contractual basis on arms control, it is necessary to diligently analyze which single risks represent the real threat to security in the future. Over the past year, the threat of global nuclear war has decreased; however serious threat remains in the potential development of nuclear regional conflicts. Moreover, today there is the danger that nuclear arms may fall into the hands of terrorist organizations and use, in the least worse case, as blackmail. This requires the implementation of more effective control over nuclear related materials.

    Reversion from a bipolar geopolitical environment that existed in the cold war, to a unipolar one, reduces the danger of a full-scale war between the rich countries. However, the experience of the past decade clearly demonstrated that local armed conflicts also represent a real threat to global stability and result in considerable human sacrifices.

    Scores of similar problems exist that require attention. Successful creation of a security system for the new millennium will depend on finding solutions that are both reliable, and meet to the interests of all participants. Therefore, it is necessary to proceed from the understanding that the security of individual states cannot be separated from the safety of all other countries.

THE ABM TREATY AND UKRAINE’S INTERESTS

    - Is it worth it for Ukraine to stick to this Treaty at all? Any contract carries some type of additional restrictions...

    The question of Ukraine’s full participation in the ABM Treaty is important. First, it allows access to information concerning the creation of anti-ballistic missile defensive systems in Russia and the US. Second, in the long term it provides legal rights for development of a national antimissile defense system as an important element in Ukraine’s defense at a regional level. Third, if we have the right to succeed to the Treaty, the opportunity will arise for unimpeded mutually advantageous scientific and technical cooperation in the ABM area with the states-parties of the ABM Treaty (both with Russia and the US). In this case, it is also important to remember that Ukraine has a system that is pertinent to Russia’s ABM strategic system. In Ukraine - in Sevastopol and Mukachevo - two missile attack warning systems, ground radars, with constant pulse mode operations designed to identify and define the coordinates of space objects flying into the radar’s zone, a range of up to 1900 kilometers. Which brings up another issue at hand, the ratification of the agreement with the Russian Federation on joint operation of the warning systems. It may be possible to submit this contract to the Verhovna Rada for consideration in combination with the Agreement on Succession to the AMB Treaty. This would create auspicious conditions for cooperation with the West in the sphere of ABM. It would then become easier to convince supporters of closer ties with Europe and the US as well as supporters of closer links with Russia that cooperation in the ABM sphere gives Ukraine a good chance to assert its interests on two “fronts”.

    - What would happen if the described possibility failed and Russia refuses services from our warning systems. To pay for the work from our own pocket?

    - I believe that in such a case, it would be better to pay from one’s own pocket. This is an important moment. Some contend that a nuclear-weapons free Ukraine does not need such systems. However, the stations can provide information not only on a strategic attack, but also on situations in space. Surely we are interested in information that would indicate, for example, where a missile would impact our territory, departure of airplanes, or information on space devices that could potentially fall on Ukraine. It is exclusive data that is valued in peace time and even more so in wartime. So, we are fortunate to have two such powerful units in this area.

    They can track all of the Middle East and the northern part of Africa. Namely this region is whence Europe strongly fears a missile threat. The Kharkov Center of Ballistics independently processes the information from our early warning systems and we have already offered to create a mutually advantageous exchange with the information center ‘ZES’ in Spain. Even they can not track the Middle East.

    At the start of this year, after last Yeltsin and Clinton’s September announcement on “Information Exchange on Missile Launching and Early Warning”, the creation on a bilateral bases of an early warning system center in Moscow was already being discussed. This center would reduce the superpowers suspicions of each other and minimize the threat of a global war arising from technical failure of national warning systems. Other countries would be allowed to participate in the center. Information would be collected via Russian and USA space and ground based warning systems. Ukraine automatically enters into the activity of the center. The USA is ready to contribute considerable funding to the creation of the center, although since the events in Kosovo, the idea has been put on hold.