THE ABM IS ALREADY FATED FOR CHANGES

    Signed in 1972, the ABM Treaty between the USSR and the USA is based of the idea of mutually assured stalemate. The contract forbids the participants to develop antimissile defense systems, which are capable of effectively resisting the strategic nuclear warheads of the opponent. Moscow and Washington agreed that an “antimissile defense umbrella” of each party would be opened only above an area 150 kilometers in diameter. The remaining area of the country would be almost defenseless and under such conditions, as was planned, either party to the Treaty would not initiate a nuclear conflict - knowing the consequences of a retaliatory nuclear strike. The permitted ABM systems (stationary ground bases) have precise parameters in accordance with a precise area. In the former Soviet Union, the ABM system protects the Moscow region and in the USA, the ICBM base at Grand-Forks (South Dakota). The contract limits ABM systems in the USSR and the USA to merely a symbolical number. Each party to the Treaty is authorized to have no more than 100 launch systems.

    After the disintegration of the USSR, the status of the Treaty became complicated. First, ambiguity surfaced over which CIS countries were responsible for continuation of the ABM treaty. Second, the US began to carry out policy directed on strengthening the protective antimissile defense umbrella over America and its armies, in which ballistic missiles of a limited range would be deployed. Washington insisted that the purpose of these efforts was to protect the territory of the US from single missile attacks. Over the past quarter century, technical capabilities have extended to such an extent that tactical missiles are owned by significant number of countries, including those with unstable political regimes capable of using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the USA. Such countries include North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. At the same time, new antimissile developments are not directed against Russia, as they would not be effective for this purpose. The answer to the first issue was fixed in an agreement signed September 26, 1997, whereby Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan became the Treaty successors. In the same package of documents, was an agreement stating that development in the field of tactical ABM was legal as the ABM Treaty of 1972 did not forbid it.

    The question concerning the admissibility of further development of ABM systems was left undetermined. Moscow regards the US’s explanations of the necessity of such development with suspicion. In particular, Russian generals consider all initiatives of the USA in the ABM area to have hidden agendas to strengthen the defense against Russian strategic missiles, and thus to achieve strategic military superiority. Subsequently, all attempts by the USA to convince Russia to renegotiate the ABM Treaty have been met reluctantly by Moscow. However, on June 20 of this year at meeting between the American and Russian Presidents in Cologne, Boris Yeltsin agreed on what Moscow never agreed previously. He was ready to discuss modernization of the ABM Treaty of 1972.

    The readiness of Moscow to depart from its “invariance” on the Treaty was considered proof that in Russia, there are practically no elements that would support the preservation of the ABM Treaty if the US were to leave this treaty on account of Russia’s obstinacy. On July 23, Bill Clinton signed a bill on the creation of a national antimissile defense system. The document, earlier approved by Congress, authorizes the Pentagon to place elements of an anti-ballistic missile defense system on the country’s territory when it “will be technically possible”. This decision categorically necessitates the reconsideration of the ABM Treaty. Considering that Ukraine is a successor to the treaty after the disintegration of the USSR, Kyiv is now required to formulate its own position on antimissile defense along with the superpowers.

UMBRELLAS” PER STATE

    - Anatoly Ivanovich, nearly two years have passed since the signing of the New York Agreement that were regarded as “the second breath” for the ABM Treaty. The Agreement broadened the definition of non-strategic ABM systems, demonstrated trust over the control of states’ activity in the creation and development of ABM systems, and very important for Ukraine, confirmed the decision to transform the bilateral Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

    Today against the background of the US initiatives to create a national ABM system and rather dual-meaning estimations of such actions in Moscow as well as the discontent of Russia by similar actions of Washington again rises the question: “What future awaits the ABM Treaty? Is the effectiveness of the New York arrangements equaled to zero?”

    - The importance of the September 26, 1997 Agreement, signed by the foreign ministers of the USA, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, is that the parties have agreed to the preservation of the ABM Treaty, the development of non-strategic antimissile defense systems and have initiated the process for negotiations. Under the present conditions, there are opportunities for use of this negotiation mechanism by all states party to the ABM. So “zero efficiency” need not be spoken.

    However, the current situation is not simple. There are many reasons which considerably complicate the achievement of concessions between the US and Russia. The former and current American position is to keep the Treaty, but with significant changes. In the US, there are supporters of limited ABM system, which would protect America from single missile attacks from “rouge” states or an un-authorized launch from Russia. The decision of the American president to approve the creation of a national ABM system is actually the result of long battles between the US Administration and Congress, where the main lobbyists of the anti-missile initiative are located.

    In turn, Moscow asserted that Russia would not agree to reexamine the ABM Treaty. However now, it seems the situation has slightly changed. In June of this year, after the Cologne meeting of the US and Russian presidents, Moscow for the first time officially acknowledged the possibility of modifying the text of the Treaty. The START talks should convene this autumn, as will talks concerning amendments to the ABM Treaty. The American side has even expressed the hope that by June 2000 an agreement with Russia will be reached on such amendments.

    It seems to me that alteration to the Treaty is unavoidable. One of the most probable alterations to the treaty concerns the quantity of regions where antimissile systems could be deployed. This is actually a return to the original idea of the 1972 Treaty when the USSR and US agreed that each party would have two areas with a radius 150 kilometers where strategic antimissile systems could be placed. After two years, it was decided to limit the quantity to one area.

    However it is unlikely that Russia could find the money for the creation of another ABM area, and this would be one of the reasons that Moscow would not support such a plan…

    One aspect is the legal possibility. The second is concrete efforts in that direction. Will Russia be able to develop a second area? This is Russia’s right. However, as for Russia’s interests, it is more reasonable to keep the Treaty as a basis of stability, establishing some changes, rather than to “strike a pose” and refuse to compromise. The choice between rejecting the Treaty and preserving it unaltered - is not a choice. The existence of this Treaty is a condition for the existence of other arrangements in the arms control field. This entire system could fall apart if the ABM treaty were to be nullified. But what is the sense in preserving the Treaty if its main functions will no longer be carried out, i.e. supporting strategic parity between the US and Russia? Having two ABM areas instead of one, America would have additional advantages over Russia, which is unable to create second ABM area.

    The reason behind the deployment of a national ABM, as the US states, is the protection of the country against missile attacks from unstable regimes. The chances of such an attack are not high. Although the Americans, it seems, take into account highly overestimated parameters. For example, imagine a situation where a submarine carrying “ten-headed” nuclear missiles goes out of control. Such a scenario is highly unlikely and even if applied to our current topic, two areas would be sufficient to protect the entire country. These issues would not have a negative influence on the preservation of nuclear parity between the US and Russia provided that the quantity of antimissiles would be limited within the framework of the Treaty. What could not be decided are higher level issues such as resisting Russian missiles with nuclear weapons in a mass strike. It is impossible to suppose that the US has ignored this condition. Because then really arises power asymmetry and in a unipolar world there is always a temptation to take advantage of the situation.

    - Does this mean that at this stage of negotiations, we should support Russia?

    - We should support retaining the Treaty. Mild concessions are more acceptable than a complete break-up of the Treaty and the termination of all negotiations.

    Although Ukraine also has undertaken obligations to abide by the former USSR’s international arms control agreements, “carrying the rights” on the ABM has been problematic. By and large, full participation in the ABM Treaty will come about only after the September 26, 1997 Agreement is ratified by the legislative bodies of old and new participants – the USA, Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. However, ratification has not been completed and such delays cast doubt on the multilateral character of the Treaty. Moreover, the USA has been against such multilaterality and considered that after disintegration of the USSR, it would be better to only deal with Russia: the more participants - the more difficult it is to made amendments. Now there are hints that in the USA, there are supporters to conduct negotiations only with Russia. In such a case, Moscow could agree to a second site in the USA, and the USA, at the turn, could agree that Russia could increase its nuclear missiles.

    There can not be such a approach, when regarding a Treaty which was signed during the USSR and concerned strategic offensive weapons or missiles of medium to short range, Ukraine would carry the full obligations and yet step aside during negotiations. However, the primary task at the moment for Ukraine is to ratify the Treaty. Till now, we have adhered to the strategy that the main participants should solve the ratification issue. But under the present conditions, I believe that there is no right to remain on the sidelines. By such a step we could complicate all previously achieved arrangements, including proposals to rewrite the ABM Treaty anew - on a bilateral basis. This is very dangerous in modern conditions. This work demands a lot of time and with uncertain results the woven fabric of restraint will begin to loosen and break apart at the seams.

THE ABM TREATY AND UKRAINE’S INTERESTS

    - Is it worth it for Ukraine to stick to this Treaty at all? Any contract carries some type of additional restrictions...

    The question of Ukraine’s full participation in the ABM Treaty is important. First, it allows access to information concerning the creation of anti-ballistic missile defensive systems in Russia and the US. Second, in the long term it provides legal rights for development of a national antimissile defense system as an important element in Ukraine’s defense at a regional level. Third, if we have the right to succeed to the Treaty, the opportunity will arise for unimpeded mutually advantageous scientific and technical cooperation in the ABM area with the states-parties of the ABM Treaty (both with Russia and the US). In this case, it is also important to remember that Ukraine has a system that is pertinent to Russia’s ABM strategic system. In Ukraine - in Sevastopol and Mukachevo - two missile attack warning systems, ground radars, with constant pulse mode operations designed to identify and define the coordinates of space objects flying into the radar’s zone, a range of up to 1900 kilometers. Which brings up another issue at hand, the ratification of the agreement with the Russian Federation on joint operation of the warning systems. It may be possible to submit this contract to the Verhovna Rada for consideration in combination with the Agreement on Succession to the AMB Treaty. This would create auspicious conditions for cooperation with the West in the sphere of ABM. It would then become easier to convince supporters of closer ties with Europe and the US as well as supporters of closer links with Russia that cooperation in the ABM sphere gives Ukraine a good chance to assert its interests on two “fronts”.

    - What would happen if the described possibility failed and Russia refuses services from our warning systems. To pay for the work from our own pocket?

    - I believe that in such a case, it would be better to pay from one’s own pocket. This is an important moment. Some contend that a nuclear-weapons free Ukraine does not need such systems. However, the stations can provide information not only on a strategic attack, but also on situations in space. Surely we are interested in information that would indicate, for example, where a missile would impact our territory, departure of airplanes, or information on space devices that could potentially fall on Ukraine. It is exclusive data that is valued in peace time and even more so in wartime. So, we are fortunate to have two such powerful units in this area.

    They can track all of the Middle East and the northern part of Africa. Namely this region is whence Europe strongly fears a missile threat. The Kharkov Center of Ballistics independently processes the information from our early warning systems and we have already offered to create a mutually advantageous exchange with the information center ‘ZES’ in Spain. Even they can not track the Middle East.

    At the start of this year, after last Yeltsin and Clinton’s September announcement on “Information Exchange on Missile Launching and Early Warning”, the creation on a bilateral bases of an early warning system center in Moscow was already being discussed. This center would reduce the superpowers suspicions of each other and minimize the threat of a global war arising from technical failure of national warning systems. Other countries would be allowed to participate in the center. Information would be collected via Russian and USA space and ground based warning systems. Ukraine automatically enters into the activity of the center. The USA is ready to contribute considerable funding to the creation of the center, although since the events in Kosovo, the idea has been put on hold.