Since the time of T. Hobbs, security (national, as well as international) has been considered the government’s affair, based on the instruments of collective protection of man and the nation in a complicated and often hostile enemy environment. Therefore, the creation of an adequate system of national security for the young Ukrainian State is a high priority. Integration with existing systems of international security will guarantee Ukraine’s survival and successful economic and political development.

    The foundation and development of the Ukrainian State have coincided with dramatic changes in the bipolar world, formed at the end of the Second World War. The realignment of new global and euroatlantic security structures is still very far from completion.

    The contemporary world is characterized by dynamic progress, changing right before our eyes. The new economic, socio-political, and cultural developments appearing will determine the shape of the future. New states and alliances appearing on the global stage aspire to be firmly incorporated into the geopolitical world structure and the new configuration of international relations. Ukraine’s priority is the organic entry into the European and global community and new regional and global security structures. Ukraine must find its place that will correspond to its potential as a large European state and guarantee its stability and development.

    In modern conditions, Ukraine’s foreign policy behavior is defined as multi-vectored, which on a practical level is frequently understood as simplistic. The representatives of various political forces verbalize their positions on foreign policy priorities and security priorities of Ukraine according to their own ideological tastes. The sharpest discussions are unfolding between the ones who view the strengthening of ties with post-communist Russia as a priority and as the ones who believe that Ukraine’s priority lies in its inclusion in the euroatlantic structure. The political orientations of the two sides’ ideas reflect the stereotype of the bipolar world, which are burdened by confrontational structures. As known, this style of thinking was common during the “Cold War”; it is necessary to understand that it is still impressed upon consciousness of many strata of the population. Taking into account the radical shifts that have taken place over the last decade, or more correctly, the multi-polar geopolitical structure, what actually developed is a mona-polar world order, understanding the indisputable role of the US as the world leader.

    These systems reflect certain realities of the modern world, but only in an abstract sense and thus should be perceived with caution. They reduce the reality and frequently impose stereotypes of confrontational thinking, fixing in the consciousness this or this line of geo-strategic opposition.

    In our opinion, the geopolitical sphere is now divided by internal lines of intensity between areas where law and international right dominate and human rights are a priority, and those areas characterized by lawlessness, numerous local conflicts, hypertensed criminal forces and other occurrences that generally threaten security, stability and the development of mankind. Hence, in this sense it is possible to speak about the basic axis of confrontation in the modern world. The counteraction of destructive forces is the most important priority of every state, according to which the development of its foreign policy is built as well as the search for partners and allies. According to such positions, the various vectors of foreign policy and security policy of Ukraine are formed.

    The problem of a geopolitical choice can be put not only on a “multi-vectored” level, but also on a level of bilateral cooperation with separate countries of the world. In this connection is the question of strategic partnership, including security, which at this time is confusing enough considering that the ranks of “strategic partners” often do not include states whose national interests coincide with Ukraine’s. Sometimes the potential to develop cooperation appears quicker than the real condition. On the other hand, Ukraine’s inclusion in the existing modern geopolitical system is hinged on the choice of strategically important partners.

    Strictly speaking, until now Ukraine has not had reliable strategic partners among the countries of the world. The search is a long and complex process that depends on many factors. Strategic partnerships anticipates a high degree of common interests both in geo-economic and in geo-strategic perspectives. In order to adjust such relations, Ukraine, proceeds keeping in mind its interests and relying on the acquired experience of interactions with various countries of the world.

    Ukraine’s multi-vectored geo-strategy and security policy in the post-bipolar world assumes comprehension of the cardinal changes in all spheres of life of the last century.

    Obtaining relations with the European world is determined by Ukraine’s national interests, which strive for integration but not at any cost, and in view of all possible consequences for the Ukrainian people.

    On the other hand, there is a precise reason why Ukraine occupies an extremely important place in Europe. In particular, NATO documents and statements from leading EU politicians constantly emphasize that Ukraine is winning back a key role in the European security system. Thus, the choice of Ukraine’s rate of integration into Europe’s economic and political structures are not only defined by Ukraine’s national interests but those of the EU as well.

    Nevertheless for a number of economic, political and socio-psychological reasons, neither Ukraine nor the West is prepared to integrate Ukraine into euroatlantic military-political of structure as a full member at the present time.

    The future of the European security system, as well as future of the relations between Ukraine, NATO, WEU (Western European Union) or the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) will depend a great deal on the results of Ukraine’s search, WEU and NATO, its “raison d’etre”, and its role and place in the new Europe. European and the euroatlantic security structures have not completely realigned in accordance with the fundamental changes in European security. Moreover, Ukraine has not yet decided (even for itself) problems of geopolitical identity.

    Thus Ukraine’s future relations with these structures should be examined not only in the context of today’s realities, but also in a context of possible changes to the structural and functional principles of these organizations and the geopolitical priorities of Ukraine.

    It is necessary to recognize that today, attempts to develop even standard structural principles for the new architecture of European security have appeared fruitless. Programs such as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) will unlikely change the situation.

    There is a danger that they will actually slow down the process of modernizing European security structures. At the time of it’s creation, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (at the time NACC) halted the process of NATO expansion eastward for 4-5 years.

    From the other side, NATO does not call up any doubt, after having repeatedly demonstrated its high efficiency together with the reformed WEU, that it can serve at the main element of new architecture of the European system of collective security.

    Attempts to construct an all encompassing model of security for Europe on the basis OSCE, as Russia and many other countries suggest, and create a European Security Council (ESC) in the manner of the UN Security Council, will surely be counterproductive and bring more problems and difficult questions than solutions (“What countries will be members of the ESC?”, “Who will receive the right to veto?”, “Will ESC decisions be binding to all countries, organizations, including NATO?” etc.).

    The prevalence of NATO and WEU synchronously underscores the prevalence of stability in Central and East Europe. Ukraine’s aspirations to be incorporated into the system of European collective security is entirely natural. But the process requires time; a certain transition period is needed. During this period, during which Ukraine’s western neighbors will be joining NATO and WEU, these organizations will become more open to cooperation in the creation of an all-European system of collective security.

    A transition period is necessary for Ukraine by virtue of internal circumstances and its geopolitical situation. For example, the immediate introduction of Ukraine into NATO, according to results of sociological researches, would result in an increase of socio-political intensity in the country caused by various geopolitical orientations in Ukraine’s east and western regions.

    In the case of the WEU, Ukraine has additional difficulties. Strangely, although admittedly, the WEU is a much more closed and elite club than NATO. The WEU’s double standard in regards to its associated partnership to the Baltic countries and Ukraine is amazing not only in Ukraine.

    Surely the example in Belarus has taught something. There is no doubt that the loss of Belarus was one of the largest strategic mistakes at the end of the Cold War. Belarus had a democratic government and searched in vain for assistance and support. We have what we have today as a result.

    For the time being, relations between Ukraine and West-European Union are reduced to regular exchanges of visits and information. Let’s remember that in the Kirshberskiy declaration from May 9, 1994 when the WEU Council of Ministers agreed to give the status of “associated partner” to countries, which have concluded or should conclude in the near future agreements on associated membership in the EU. In this manner, six eastern European states, plus the Baltic States entered, but not Ukraine. The position of EU and WEU, as emphasized by President Kuchma in Vienna in October 1998, can result in occurrence of new lines of division in Europe, including the Ukrainian-Polish border.

    A key aspect of western strategy concerning Ukraine has become the “open doors” strategy, which grants Ukraine a chance within a specified period of time to enter the North Atlantic Treaty (if on the national level the appropriate decision will be approved). Some western analysts, in particular Zb. Bzhezinskiy, believe that in 2010 and even earlier Ukraine will be able to meet the standards of NATO.

    It is necessary to recognize that the absence of an opportunity to join NATO can considerably damage politically Ukraine and undermine the process of reform. Thus, after the initial stage of expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty, it makes sense to discuss possible candidates for the “second wave”, including those new countries of Central Europe and the former USSR, which have expressed a desire to become full members.

    The NATO member states, in opinion of the authors, need to at a minimum analyze the difficulties and obstacles on the road to gaining membership in the Treaty for these countries (including Ukraine). It is possible that some of the problems on that road will be overwhelming for countries individually. Therefore, NATO states should utilize important preventive measures for these problems and develop concrete strategic plans for each potential member of the Treaty.

    The Ukrainian plan for integration into European and euroatlantic structures by no means diminishes the importance of Ukraine’s “east vector” politics in the security sphere.

    Ukraine builds relations with the Russian Federation as partners with equal rights. The benefit of such an approach is the Treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership, and the program of economic cooperation for 1998-2007. We aspire by common efforts to achieve the highest level of cooperation. This also meeb strategic interests of both countries, as sovereign, independent states. These sovereign independent states must carry out their own internal and external policy, proclaim a neutrality or blockade, create economic, political and military unions, and organize alliances and blocks, all in accordance with its national interests and national security.

    No less important from the point of view of national and international security are Ukraine’s relations with the CIS countries. It should be noted that existing mechanisms of cooperation within the framework of the CIS are still far from perfect. The strategic interests of the participants in this structure are varied.

    For Ukraine and several other republics, the main attraction of the CIS consists in the creation of equal rights in economic association for the sovereign states without any supranational structures. They categorical ly reject the idea of creating a new center in Moscow. Therefore, Ukraine constantly stresses the status of its associated membership and assiduously avoids close participation in political and military cooperation. Moldova has proclaimed that its participation is limited solely to the economic sphere. For the most part, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan refused to sign the CIS agreements or to take part in real cooperation. The majority of CIS initiatives ended in failure. The leading ministries of Ukraine came to the conclusion that proposals prepared in Moscow regarding a customs and monetary union with the Russian Federation and possible membership for Ukraine in a full economic union, were premature. Particularly keeping in mind that the Ukrainian proposals concerning the protection of economic sovereignty of the CIS countries was discounted during the preparation of the related documents.

    More than that, Ukraine’s participation in the proposed unions could be evaluated as changing its foreign policy and could damage the EU states-parties’ perceptions of Ukraine as an independent state. The connection of Ukraine to the mentioned above agreements could be considered by the Russian Federation as a specter to further its efforts in other supranational structures under the aegis of the CIS (in particular military and political).

    Thus, Ukraine’s full membership in the mentioned structures would only result in its political and economic alienation from Central-and West-European countries.

    In conditions of deep political and economic crisis in the Russian Federation and some other countries of CIS, powerful political forces are born which envision the recreation the former USSR as a self-contained geo-economical and geopolitical space via reintegration of the CIS states. Consequences for the new democratic states, including Ukraine, would be isolation from civilized processes, reversion to technological backwardness, loss of sovereignty and so forth.

    A rational Ukrainian policy concerning the CIS should be based first, on national rather than clannish or corporate interests, and second, on strengthening an alternative leadership in this organization and in the general region. As it was already mentioned, the CIS actually already has a bipolar structure. The formation of GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) under the leadership of Ukraine and the support of other countries, who understand the advantages and benefits of creating regional group based on principles of equality and mutual support, were only the first attribute of a new extremely important integration process on the territory of the former USSR. The result of this process will be the formation of regional structures and unions “without Moscow”, and Ukraine can apply for the post of “first among equal” in these new creations.

    GUUAM and the countries of Central Asia already represent nine countries of the CIS, who resolutely support the idea of creating new equal and mutually advantageous structures of cooperation. If one adds the growing cooperation of Ukraine with the Baltic countries and the formation in May 1997 of a Baltic-Black Sea Alliance (Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania), the tendencies of the integration process in the post-soviet region become completely clear.

    Actually, the CIS countries have a lot in common other than the historical past. The primary interests of the separate CIS countries more and more are becoming centrifugal from the CIS direction. Criticism is growing against the Russian Federation, who tries to use the CIS structures in its own interests, neglecting the interests of the other members.

    It is unlikely that the creation in Eurasia of one more community in the European style will affect integration into existing European structures, taking into account the selected course by Ukraine. Rigid binding to the new, “strengthened” CIS model will always indicate a refusal of the independent European policy, and in due course, from any independence in foreign political and foreign economic business. Between the two systems there will be a competitive struggle for geo-strategic and geo-economic influences, in which Ukraine take on an important role. For Ukraine, it is important to develop roads, which will lead to the gradual transformation of the entire Eurasian geopolitical space – from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean – into a uniform community of sovereign states without the domination of one center. Ukraine is interested in becoming involved with both the highly technological European market and the capacious markets in East, in particular countries in the Asian - Pacific region, which involves roads running through the Russian Federation and Central Asia.