a) The Middle East

On account of the great geostrategic importance of the region, the interests of global economic powers and of several great states, such as the US, some European countries, and the Russian Federation overlap in it. Western concerns and, and following them, governments of correspondent states, are directly interested in control over natural resources in Middle Eastern and Central Asian states, and Black Sea-Caspian region countries. In the least, they are interested in profiting from their exploitation. The realization of large-scale trans-Asian transportation projects promotes the reorientation of Central Asian states toward the West. In this case Ukraine becomes one of the unifying links between the West and the East and thus has a chance of becoming a focus of one of the new systems of international interchange.

Ukrainian national interests in the Middle East demand the preliminary development of economic relations with regional states. This is expressed through traditional (since USSR times) trade-economic cooperation; the considerable scope and relative modesty of goods markets; the annual growth in the exchange of goods with a stable balance favorable for Ukraine; good opportunities for the sale of military-technical production and for the repair of Soviet military equipment and weaponry; the presence of stores of raw materials and energy resources; the possibility for participation in projects involving the development of the infrastructures of these countries; the opportunities to supply transit facilities for the movement of these states' goods to European markets and vice versa.

In view of the necessity for resolving the problem of the diversification of energy supply sources, the development of Ukraine's policy concerning states of the risk group - Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, demands special attention. In mind here is a more flexible and possibly non-explicable way of behavior, which borders on the acceptable. Dividends from this can significantly exceed some moral losses. In order to increase cooperation with Middle Eastern countries it may be prudent for Ukraine to activate its diplomacy toward agreements with the RF and with European states.

Potential Ukrainian interests regarding Israel include its possible help in the solicitation of investments from sources controlled by Jewish financial circles, the obtaining of modern technologies and know-how, and the utilization of the US Jewish Diaspora's lobby potential for promoting Ukrainian interests. The realization of the mentioned interests in the nearest future, however, will remain problematic. Expectations for receiving considerable funds from world financial establishments do not seem justified today. Israeli interests concerning Ukraine consist of the prevention of the increase of Ukrainian cooperation with Islamic states, and of the development of new markets for its own goods in correspondence with the strategy of export diversification. It is important to maintain a tolerant and deliberate position concerning Israel, to develop relations only on a bilateral basis, taking into account potential opportunities without exceeding the framework of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Ukraine has to bear in mind the attitude toward Israel of leading European states that demonstrate a more balanced position to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli or US counteraction to concrete projects of Ukrainian cooperation with unreconciled Islamic states can be considered only in the case of adequate compensation in the form of financial aid or favorable credits.

It is necessary to constitute that the effectiveness of economic interaction in the widely advertised Israel - Ukraine - US triangle is far from being optimal. Ukraine's strategic partners mostly use "special relations" primarily to put pressure on Ukraine in order to promote their political interests (it is sufficient to recall issues relating to rocket technologies, the supply of turbines to Iran etc.). Additionally, in exchange for significant political concessions and direct economic losses Ukraine in the best case is proposed new credits, which will have to be returned. At the same time, a symbiosis of Israel's new high technologies and capital with cheap Ukrainian raw materials and labor could serve as a basis for the development of mutually beneficial Ukrainian-Israeli relations. Of no lesser importance is the fact that Israel could obtain an unhampered outlet through Ukraine to the markets of post-Soviet space. Ukraine, meanwhile, with Israeli help could more effectively solve many of its problems in its relations with the USA.

Ukraine's position concerning the states of the Persian Gulf remains groundlessly passive. This region, however, holds a position of exclusive interest for Ukraine because of the opportunities for the diversification of energy supply sources and for possible participation in oil extraction, metallurgical processing and transportation projects that it provides. It is also of interest as a promising market for weaponry and military equipment. It would be a mistake to forget that the Persian Gulf is a source of powerful investment capital, whose general volume exceeds 300 billion US dollars. The drawing of at least part of this capital to Ukraine for the purposes of financing the construction of transportation corridors between the Middle East and Europe through Ukrainian territory could become a reality in the case of the creation of an attractive investment climate in Ukraine.

Increasing Ukrainian cooperation with Turkey and Israel should not assist the involvement of our state in the pro-American military-political triangle that is being formed in the region as this will result in significant losses in relations with other Middle Eastern states.

Among the Middle Eastern states, Egypt, whose initiative started the Mediterranean dialog, is the closest to the pro-European paradigm. Egypt is one of the leaders of the Arab-Islamic world, but in contradistinction to other Arab countries it holds a more balanced position in its relations with the international community. The main features of this course are an orientation toward own national interests, and a balancing between the different political and ideological schemes of orientation influential in the region. Egypt is interested in finding in Ukraine a trusted and coequal partner in order to put forth its interests concerning the European world as well as to solve regional problems.

Based on the development of partnership with Egypt and having garnered the support of European states (France, Italy), Ukraine has a chance to enter the Mediterranean dialog, analogous to the BSEC system, where Egypt holds the status of observer. In both cases these are outlying economic areas of west-European spheres of influence that can become more integrated with each other in the future. The development of a strategy for the formation of a general zone of economic cooperation from the Gibraltar to the Caucuses under the EU's aegis, which together with the TRACECA transportation system would create favorable space for the realization of Ukrainian interests.

Holding a separate position in the region is Iran, which thanks to the efforts of American diplomacy finds itself in a certain foreign political isolation, at least in relations with the West. The Islamic revolution in Iran is an example of the warding off of western modernization, and is also an attempt at the adaptation of society to change sans the destruction of its cultural values. In the pre-industrial epoch Iran's geostrategic position had allowed it to function as a bridge between Central, Southern, Eastern Asia and Europe.

After Saudi Arabia Iran holds the second place in the world as an oil-producing state, with an annual profit of approximately 20 billion US dollars. This allows Iran to maintain significant armed forces and to undergo large-scale rearmament. The thought that Iran, with China's help, is creating an infrastructure for the production of nuclear weapons predominates in the West. Central Asian experts, however, do not regard Iran to be a threat to regional security, as the main goal in the increase of its military potential is to form a regional center of power in the Persian Gulf.

Iran regards itself and its strategic interests and goals to be placed into three spheres: as the savior of Islamic values, as an important member of the Third World in the struggle against neo-colonialism and as a player in the game of oil-gas policy in the international arena.

Through the Alma-Ata Resolution Iran immediately recognized the newly independent states on December 25, 1991. Preceding this, Iran was taking into consideration the delicate nature of its relations with Moscow. The decision was made because of the fact that changes in the USSR had a direct influence on Iran's national security. Iran greeted these republics at the meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Teheran (February, 1992), supported their entry into the Non-Alignment Movement and into the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and initiated the creation of the Organization of Caspian states. Restored as a result of Iran's initiative, the ECO includes Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and from 1992, all states of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. It is planned that in future this organization will form the basis for an "Islamic common market".

Iran today actively pretends to the role of the power that is able to affect political and economic patronage of the region. Iran has vital interests concerning the guaranteeing of stability in the region, but its international isolation considerably restrains its activity. Iran's chances are also reduced as a result of the domination of its own static economic model. The weakening of the private sector has resulted in a disadvantage of quality of Iranian goods in comparison with Chinese goods. Iran is not able to offer the modern technologies that are desperately needed by the new independent states of the region.

Iran is conducting an independent foreign-policy game, counteracting western states, competing with Turkey and Pakistan, and trying not to sharpen its relations with Russia. It is developing economic and political cooperation with its northern neighbor Turkmenistan, has considerable influence over ethnically and culturally related Tadjikistan, and supports the Shiite-Tadjik-Uzbek anti-Taliban coalition in Afghanistan.

After the USSR's collapse Turkey and Iran found themselves in a situation of conflicting interests, struggling, in fact, for influence in the region. Moreover, Iran is attempting to force so-called "political Islam" onto the region, that is, to create possibilities for directly influencing the policies of new states through the help of an ideological hegemony. Turkey is also actively using the factor of political and economic influence within the environment of Turkish nations. Growing awareness of the role of ethnic proximity increases the intensification of the consolidation processes of Turkish states, which have recently become especially active.

Iran is especially interested in attaining nuclear capability. The West regards the penetration of Soviet nuclear technologies and weaponry into Iran to be another danger, separate from the spreading of Iranian-Islamic influence. Publications have appeared in the western mass media about former Soviet nuclear scientists helping Iran with the production of nuclear weapons, about the transfer of nuclear materials to Iran, etc.

The possibilities for the gradual transformation of Ukrainian-Iranian relations into a strategic partnership have seemed problematic from the time of the Ukrainian refusal, under US pressure, to supply turbines for Iran's NPS. In general, however, Ukraine is interested in the development of friendly partnership relations with Iran. Despite insignificant present trade-economic cooperation between both states, they have great potential due to the development of trade within the Ukraine-Turkmenistan-Iran triangle, the development of the trans-Asian transport network (TRACECA), the possibilities of oil supply from the Persian Gulf, etc.

b) Central and South Asia

The geostrategic significance of the region is determined by its placement in the middle of the Asian continent, on the cross-roads of communications between Europe and Asia. Central Asia does not have direct outlets to the world's oceans. Its communication system with world markets is connected with land transportation and energy routes, while its relations with the world's civilizational system depend on contacts with adjacent states, their stability and the possibilities of their communications routes.

The turbulent events of 1989-1991, which culminated in the collapse of the USSR, significantly accelerated the process of the isolation of Central Asian societies. Former Soviet republics of the region entered the course of independent development. The commonality of interests of ruling élites and the level of their consolidation that was formed during Soviet times - the centralization of power, the implementation of a single ideological model and the suppression of embryonic forms of democracy - assisted the establishment of relative political stability in Central Asian republics and gave them an ability to resist different expressions of religious and ethnically-separatist activity.

The non-correspondence of the authoritarian systems of the new states to democratic principles of the European type poses the question as to the possibility of any other real alternative that would guarantee political stability at the present stage of development of Central Asian societies. The bitter experience of the Tadjiki or Afghani conflicts makes the "leap" from the kingdom of a totalitarian lack of freedom to democracy in Asian conditions seem utopian. Calls for the acceleration of democratization in the conditions of an unready society can solicit the opposite effect of total destabilization and society's self destruction followed by the intervention of external forces that have their own interests here.

In general the processes of transformation in Central Asian republics went the "Chinese way". An authoritarian regime permits the conduction of a strict course toward the restructuring of economic systems, which promotes economic stability in the region. This type of modernization of economic systems has certain chances for success, although the emergence of problems analogous to the Chinese can be expected together with the development of market transformations and the formation of a "middle class" in Central Asian societies.

An authoritarian form of government became acceptable for local political élites because it enabled the establishment of control over pro-Islamic traditionalism. The latter can create real competition for the existent political élite, which was formed during Soviet times. Ruling regimes ably use the religious factor for the purpose of consolidating society around the ruling ideology, taking into account the considerable influence of Islamic ideology on social life. Another threat to internal stability is connected with the so-called "Russian-language" factor. It is especially actual in Kazakhstan, where the majority of the population consists of Russian-speakers. This is a special stratum of the population that remains in a position of undeterminate self-identity and is thus able to in certain circumstances fulfill a destructive and destabilizing function. The most important regional threats of a local nature are: the processes of national-state consolidation and the legitimization of government, the formation of legal space, the shedding of remnants of the colonial past, the transformation of the socio-economic system, the solution of ethnic problems, the prevention of border confrontations.

The process of the formation of new foreign political orientations in Central Asian republics began after the collapse of the USSR. This process has regional features despite significant differences in political models and external orientations. Central Asian experts consider this region to be a separate system that has common, at times corporate, interests. The fact that participant countries pay significant attention precisely to the development of regional cooperation also testifies to the above-mentioned. This can be explained, on the one hand, as the necessity to react to significant pressure from the side of the RF, which aspires to keep its dominant position in the region, and on the other, by the similarity of political and economic interests.

After two years of independence Central Asian states have moved away from their preliminary stance of preserving close relations with the CIS. They had a common start, but it is now important to determine the type of regional system of international relations, whether it be the EU or ASEAN model, or perhaps the main dominant will become the confrontation in South Asia and in the Middle East.

Core civilizational preconditions for the formation of regional systems are encompassed in the Central Asian states' belonging to outlying areas of Islamic influence, where various civilizations have held sway. But the mixture of civilizations did not lead to the synthetic creation of the productive type. Thus a tendency toward the creation of a subconscious complex of the "inferiority of the aggressive type" exists. Although this indicates the necessity of a powerful leader (China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan) as a systematizing element, the chances for its acceptability for regional states are low. The belonging of the majority of regional states to the Tiurkic world separates them from their neighbors and becomes the ethnic precondition for the regional community. The realization of the Greater Turanic idea as a social mythologeme is possible, but numerous conflicting factors connected with ethnic mixing hinder it.

Despite the above-mentioned, regional countries are included, on different levels, in the integrational processes of several systems: the Euroasian (the CIS, the Tashkent treaty), the Islamic-Turkish (ECO) and the native Central Asian. Already in 1990 in Alma-Ata, the leaders of five states were discussing joint plans for integration. After the signing of the Belovezhska Treaties in December 1991, Turkmenistan proposed the creation of the Confederation of Central Asian States. This idea, however, did not materialize and regional states joined the CIS. At the January 1993 meeting of state and government leaders notice was given of the intention toward the regional integration of Central Asian states. This was to occur on account of the similarity of their interests: mutual security, Aral's problems and the Tadjiki crisis, the creation of single informational sphere among others.

The processes that had begun on the basis of the development of regional economic cooperation and the completion of a number of foreign political initiatives are increasingly gaining weight. The Economic Union of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan occurred in January 1994. The goal was the realization of a joint program of intensifying economic integration between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan within the framework of the CIS. The agreement created a single economic space featuring the free transfer of goods and services, capital, and labor, and the coordination of credit-accounting, budget, tax, price, customs and foreign currency policies.

An important factor in the development of regional cooperation is the creation of a trans-Asian transportation network based on the restoration of traditional communications structures. At issue is the large Eurasian transportation corridor that includes the combined usage of railways, sea and air routes, and the construction of pipeline conduit communications. Turkmeni gas (11 billion cubic meters) gets to European markets through Russia and Ukraine, but an intensive search for other routes to world markets continues.

The collapse of a bipolar geopolitical system and the loss of the USSR's powerful patronage as a superpower created significant problems for India's strategic defense schemes. India fears that the processes of reconstruction in Central Asia, ethnic tensions, the revival of Islam and civil conflicts will directly influence Pakistan, Iran and the Kashmir area toward general regional destabilization.

The Indian view on regional problems is determined by the fear of possible change toward more strategic dynamism that can occur in the present situation. The Central Asian region represents a new strategic threat to India, which is destroying the strategic balance, as the USSR had acted as a geopolitical counterweight to the forces antagonistic to India. Moreover, the Soviet threat is replaced by local conflicts and ethnic collisions (nationalism and fundamentalism). The new model of ethnic conflict is indicative of a direct threat to Indian security. The vacuum that has emerged allows for the appearance of new non-regional powers with different ideological and political interests: the political transformations and final orientations of the new states cannot leave the Indian strategic environment unchanged. Regional openness to the outer world directly reduces Indian economic domination in the region. In order to support stability in Central Asia, India concentrates its attention on the increase of bilateral cooperation with adjacent states by providing technical aid and initiating economic programs directed toward the strengthening of established connections. In ensuring regional stability India mainly relies upon non-Islamic entities (the RF and China).

In general India and South Asia are more inclined toward the Asian-Pacific region. It is worth noting, however, that Pakistan is so far staying away from this movement, as it is more connected geopolitically to the Middle East and Central Asia. Iran also requires a broad outlet to the Central Asian region not only through Turkmenistan but also through Tadjikistan, which borders with China and North India.

India is attempting to influence the situation in the APR, a fact which is being considered by the states of this region traditionally. However, India is a strategic partner of Russia and despite some recent waverings their bilateral relations are in general moving forward. Thus, India is the biggest consumer of Russian military-technical production, particularly of aircraft. A contract worth 1.8 billion US dollars dealing with the supply of 40 Su-30MK jet-fighters to India with simultaneous rights to produce airplanes in Indian factories under Russian license, and the right of export to third-party states was recently signed. Overall, the annual total of Russian weapons purchases reaches 1.5 billion dollars, which constitutes 50% of the annual export of the Russian MIC.

India is completing a large-scale program of its armed forces modernization that will continue until 2010. The strengthening of its own military power and navy, and also the development of its own MIC constitutes one of the most important aspects of this project. Attempts at reorientation toward military-technical cooperation with the West have shown little result in view of the traditional priorities of cooperation with the USSR.

India has autonomously developed its own system of nuclear weaponry. Recent underground nuclear tests in the Radjakhstan desert caused anxiety among nuclear states, as the appearance of an additional nuclear power is capable of overthrowing all existent ideas about the balance of power in the world. It is possible that these tests also represented a certain Indian announcement as to an increase in its global and sub-regional status. Additionally, they represented an effort by India to present itself as one of the main Asian center of powers, in order to fill the vacuum created by the USSR's collapse.

Ukraine has every opportunity to develop its cooperation with India, however, it is clear that under present conditions this demands close cooperation and agreement with the RF, which controls the main elements of this capacious market. The Ukrainian breakthrough onto Pakistan's weapons market caused sharp Russian reaction and significant Indian anxiety. Under the present circumstances it is doubtful that the RF will agree to allow the presence of Ukrainian competition on the Indian weapons market. On the other hand, Ukraine has to take into account the interests of the international community, which oblige Ukraine to join international sanctions against India on the nuclear issue. All of the above-mentioned considerably slows the development Ukraine's cooperation with India.

Pakistan. The development of Pakistani society testifies to the insufficient effectiveness of the chosen path of modernization and of the counteraction of crisis events caused by these processes. The shock caused by Bangladeshi separation in 1971 and the threat of further fragmentation in the end result promoted the strengthening of the state. The empowerment of the military-authoritarian regime, which in contradistinction to Turkish military regimes is more oriented toward Islamic ideology, generally slows down the processes of westernization. The educational realm is obviously unable to keep up with population growth and the almost 100 million strong stratum of the illiterate population forms the environment for the preservation of archaic forms of life and production. Internal conflicts are determined by the fixed system of government, its corruption, which mixes with differences in economic systems and interethnic problems connected with the presence of Pushtun and Beludge populations, ethnically related to Iranian and Afghani tribes.

Pakistan does not yet exercise significant influence over events in post-soviet Central Asia, however, it selectively supports Talibs in Afghanistan, who already control most of the territory in this country. In the autumn of 1994, a new political force appeared in Afghanistan at that time, that being students of religious Taliban schools who guarded the above-mentioned caravan. Islamabad supports Talibs in order to strengthen its strategic positions in Central Asia, to blockade the potential increase of Russian or Iranian influence in the region, and to seize control over communications between Central Asian states and South Asia. The last concerns, first of all, the possibilities for the construction of an oil-gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Karachi through Gerat and Kandagar, and a transportation corridor from post-Soviet Central Asia to Indostan through Termez - Kabul - Peshavar.

In contradistinction to Russia and Iran, who regard American and Turkish influence as a threat to regional stability, America and most Pakistanis consider Pakistan to be an important regional stabilizing factor. Admittedly, the US does not fear the Islamic threat and is more inclined to use Islam in reaching its own goals.

The importance of Pakistan as India's traditional opponent in this region is growing because of the formation of southerly transportation corridors from Central Asia. Pakistan exercises great influence over Afghani Talibs and has significant Islamic ambitions. In its drive toward regional leadership Pakistan depends on the support of the US, Great Britain, and states of the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, Pakistan also has nuclear capability and is able to provide an adequate answer to India's nuclear program. The local arms race between India and Pakistan can in the future destroy the existent balance of power in Asia.

Pakistan's defense strategy, in the last years built on confrontations with India and a search for influential patrons, also has to take into account threats connected with the Afghani and Tadjiki conflicts. Islamabad has certain hopes that Central Asian states are capable of guaranteeing the strategic depth of Pakistan's defense space. Geographical limits and non-Islamic neighbors' (the RF's and China's) influences in this region slow down Pakistan's aspirations for becoming one of the most important players in the region. Still, through the assistance of bilateral relations and multilateral regional formations similar to ECO, Pakistan is able to ensure technical and economic aid for Central Asian states with the goal of strengthening domestic regional stability.

Pakistani access to Central Asia is possible via three routes - through Kandagar and Gerat, through Kabul, and also via the jointly built with China in the 1960's-1980's Karakorum highway, onto Kashgar and Bishkek. Plans exist for the utilization of this route for the purpose of supplying Pakistan with Kirgizi electricity. Pakistan is interested in integrative projects that connect Central Asian republics and South Asia, especially in oil pipelines and the transportation of goods and energy to Indostan.

Pakistan is attempting to fulfill its strategic interests with the help of the intensive Islamicization of new regional states. This would also legalize Pakistan itself as it is not a national country and its borders are to a certain extent artificial and a source of contention. The spread of Pakistan's influence into the Central Asian region provides it with the necessary depth in its confrontation with India and also allows Pakistan to strengthen its own positions in its relations with the West. Pakistan will finally obtain an opportunity to promote the formation of a general Islamic common market.

These Pakistani expectations, however, are not considered to be well-founded, as the process of the Islamicization of Central Aisian states does not seem probable in the nearest future. This is due to the orientations of the political élites of these states and to the counteraction of Russian, western, and other forces. On the other hand, the idea that India is an anti-Islamic state is rather dubious. Indian contacts with Central Asian states have a significant history, while the Islamic component of Indian culture is significant. It is possible to agree with Indian analysts in the thought that no regional bloc can succeed without the participation of India, Russia or China. Interethnic wars in Afghanistan and Tadjikistan limit the opportunities for direct Pakistani influence over the region. Finally, it is worth considering that the intensification of Islamicization, which continues in Sintsyan, draws Pakistan into immediate conflict with China.

Ukraine should pay closer attention to the Middle Eastern region, that for a long time has remained aside from the core interests of our foreign policy. In the process of the restructuring of regional geopolitical balances Ukraine is capable of deciding upon the configuration that will best promote its geostrategic interests. Ukraine has considerable chances to find a fundamental place for itself in the sub-regional balance of power on account of the following: it enjoys good relations with two regional states - Turkey and Pakistan; it has friendly interactions with Central Asian states, especially with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; it is developing strategic cooperation with Egypt and Israel and is reaching an adequate level of cooperation with Iran.

Worth noting is the fact that each grouping of states is backed by world powers such as the US, the RF, China - thus entry into Middle Eastern space is connected with diplomatic flexibility and balancing skills in the field of confrontational global interests. On the other hand, however, the potential of each of the above-mentioned states is comparable to Ukraine's, which promotes the development of an equal dialog with them. To regional states Ukraine appears as a new country, that itself had recently found itself in a half colonial situation. It does not have the image of a carrier of "western" interests and is thus capable of quickly becoming an equal partner.

The rise in geopolitical significance of the Middle Eastern region for Ukraine is connected not only with the restructuring of political confrontation in Eurasia and with its natural resources, but also with shifts in transportation routes within the Old World. The importance of the sea transport of goods and services within the Old World is gradually but surely declining. The significance of air-routes, auto-transport, and in Asia, railways, is correspondingly rising. The construction, with active Japanese participation, of the trans-Eurasian high-speed railway from Beijing to Istanbul is of great importance for the future of large-scale trade within the continent. The traditional land transportation infrastructure is in the process of reconstruction within Eurasia. One of its branches will unite Europe with Central Asia via Ukraine and with South and East Asia via the Central Asian region. Ukraine finds itself in the capacity of one of the unifying links between the West and the East. Thus it has an opportunity to become the focus of one of the new centers of international communication.

Ukraine, Middle, East and Central Asian states have important mutual economic interests. Ukraine's necessity to diversify energy supply sources correlates with the needs of Asian countries to diversify their economies that formerly had colonial features based on mono-cultures and the extraction of raw materials. Despite the intensive penetration of foreign capital into the region's states, significant opportunity still exists for Ukraine to establish itself in Eastern markets. Ukraine has great intellectual and industrial potential and is capable of creating competitive production in states of the East. It is also capable of providing essential goods in the foodstuff and industrial spheres.